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FOREWORD 
For several years, problems of risk assessment, containment, and management have 
been a major concern at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). 
We commonly direct our attention for one or two years at a time to no more than two 
major issues in this field. One author of this report, Professor Howard Kunreuther, is cur-
rently heading a team at IIASA that is engaged in such a study. However, we also encourage 
shorter studies of other topics. The visits of distinguished scholars such as Professor Paul 
Kleindorfer are frequently associated with such studies. We are particularly pleased when, 
as in this instance, a collaborative report results. 
At IIASA we have paid most attention to the issues associated with man-made, tech-
nological hazards; these are new and unfamiliar, and are therefore, perhaps, of more concern 
to the public than old-fashioned, natural hazards. Yet their toll of disaster is arguably 
much smaller and less important. That is one reason why the present paper adds to II ASA 's 
work in the field of risk. 
ALEC LEE 
Chairman 
Management and Technology Area 
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Guidelines for Coping with Natural 
Disasters and Climatic Change * 
Howard Kunreuther, Laxenburg and Paul Kleindorfer, Philadelphia** 
A. Introduction 
Today there is no prevailing wind as to how society should cope with the 
economic and social impacts of weather and related phenomena. A principal 
reason for this uncertainty is that the question has only recently been raised as to 
what the responsibility of the government and private sector should be. Thus, 
even though mankind always has been plagued by problems of extreme natural 
phenomena such as floods and earthquakes, it is only within the past ten years 
that efforts have been underway to evaluate an alternative set of adjustments for 
coping with these problems 1• When one focuses on the areas of climatic change 
and weather modification, then the historical time clock associated with re-
search on the economic, social and political problems is even shorter2• 
The purpose of this paper is to propose a framework for evaluating alternative 
programs for dealing with weather-related risks. The framework emphasizes 
the impacts of limited information or misinformation on behavior. When the 
decision processes of the different actors are explicitly considered as a part of the 
problem, then alternatives which involve some form of government regulation 
may turn out to be more attractive than would otherwise have been the case. 
B. A Framework for Analysis 
Figure 1 (see p. 901) provides a schematic representation of a framework for 
analysis, indicating the descriptive and prescriptive phases of the process. The 
• The authors gratefully acknowledge support for this research from the International Institute of Management West 
Berlin 
••Professors of Decision Sciences , The Wharton School. During 1980-81 Kunreuther is a Research Scholar at the 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Vienna. 
1 White and Haas (1975) provide a comprehensive assessment of research on natural hazards. 
2 See Schneider (1976) and Cooper (1978) for lucid treatments of the potential impacts of climatic change and weather 
modification on society. 
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appropriate role of the public and private sectors (,, the prescriptive" phase) can 
be better understood if the nature of the problem, institutional arrangements 
and decisions processes (,, the descriptive" phase) are clearly spelled out. To 
illustrate consider two examples, one from United States natural hazards policy 
and the other associated with the impact of climatic change. 
Nature of the Problem 
At the outset one would like to have some understanding of the historical context 
of the problem and the types of questions that are being raised today. 
Natural Hazards Example. Since 1953 the federal government has played an 
increasing role in providing disaster relief. Few individuals have protected 
themselves voluntarily with insurance against the financial consequences of 
disasters. Many of these uninsured victims have turned to the federal govern-
ment after having suffered losses , and Congress has responded with an increas-
ingly open hand. Should disaster be treated as a public responsibility or should 
residents of hazard-prone areas bear the financial costs of living there? What are 
the appropriate programs to consider in making this choice and how should one 
evaluate them? 
Climatic Change Example. In 1974 a number of scientists independently discov-
ered that chlorine, one of the chemical elements in chlorofluorcarbons, CFC, 
was effective in destroying atmospheric gas ozone, although the magnitude of 
this change was highly uncertain. Ozone absorbs much of the ultraviolet radia-
tion from the sun so that a reduction in its amount could cause skin cancer. 
Furthermore, a reduction in ozone could lead to climatic change but the actual 
effect could not be specified precisely. A problem facing the government is what 
action should be taken with respect to those manufacturers of aerosol spray cans 
which uses CFC as propellants. Given the uncertainty associated with CFCs and 
ozone as well as the limited knowledge as to what its impact is likely to be on the 
human population, should spray cans be banned or are there other more 
appropriate policies? 
Institutional Arrangements 
In order to design appropriate policies for these and other problems we need to 
have an understanding of the institutional arrangements which define the 
informational and authority relationships among the relevant groups. Most 
problems normally involve the consumer sector, the production or service sector 
and the government sector as the relevant groups. 
In the natural hazards example, we would want to understand the types of 
interaction occupants of a hazard-prone area will have with their insurance 
agents or companies regarding the purchase of disaster coverage. We also want to 
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examine the possible interactions between the insurance industry and the 
government sector. For example, this may involve rate regulation at the state 
level (e.g., earthquake rates), reinsurance at the federal level (e.g. , flood reinsu-
rance) or joint marketing efforts behavior in the private and public sector (e.g., 
flood coverage). 
In the depletion of ozone example we would want to understand what alterna-
tive options are open to consumers and the affected businesses if aerosol sprays 
were taken off the market. We also would want to know what possible regula-
tions could be issued by the government regarding the future use of CFC and 
what evidence would be required to justify each specific ruling. 
Decision Processes 
Perhaps the most important aspect of descriptive analysis, and certainly the 
most neglected, is an understanding of the decision processes of each of the 
different actors involved in the problem. We define decision processes to mean 
the collection, processing and dissemination of specific types of information in 
determining and promoting a specific course of action. 
In the disaster insurance example it is important to understand how residents of 
hazard-prone areas evaluate the probabilities and losses associated with such 
events as floods and earthquakes. In the same spirit we need to gain insight into 
what information is collected and processed by insurance companies in determi-
ning the anticipated benefits and costs of offering different types coverage at 
specific premiums. We would then want to understand what steps are taken by 
agents to market coverage. 
· In the depletion of ozone example, it is relevant to know what information 
scientists have collected to determine the potential dangers of CFC to ozone and 
how certain they are of the future impacts on the population. In the same spirit 
one would want to better understand how these findings are interpreted by 
government regulatory agencies in handing down their pronouncements as to 
what action specific manufacturers must take. 
Fortunately we know considerably more today about the decision processes of 
individuals than we did a decade ago. Recent empirical studies in field and 
controlled laboratory settings have shed light on the behavioral processes 
associated with collecting and utilizing information and the impact that these 
phenomena are likely to have on policy prescriptions. In particular, Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) h_ave shown that individuals exhibit systematic biases in their 
processing of information. One of these biases, availability, implies that individ-
uals judge the probability of an event by the ease with which such instances are 
readily retrieved from memory. Such a heuristic implies that past experience 
will be a critical variable in individual decision-making with respect to certain 
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events. This finding suggests that individuals are likely to underestimate their 
chances of being affected in the future by low probability events which have not 
personally affected them in the past. Calabrasi (1970) makes a similar point by 
observing that ,,such things always happen to the other guy and no amount of 
statistical information can ever convince the individual that they can happen to 
him" (p. 56). 
The importance of past experience in affecting information processing of occu-
pants in hazard-prone areas is illustrated in a study by Kates (1962) who 
interviewed 110 individuals in LaFollette, Tennessee. On the basis of his findings 
he conjectured that: 
Men on flood plains appear to be very much prisoners of their experience .... 
Recently experienced floods appear to set an upper bound to the size of loss with 
which managers believe they ought to be concerned (p. 140). 
In evaluating the decision processes of individuals and firms it is also relevant to 
learn from what sources decision-aiding information is obtained. The extensive 
literature on the diffusion of innovations (see Rogers and Shoemaker, 1975) 
indicates that the mass media are normally the initial source of knowledge about 
a product but the information from more personal sources is usually obtained 
prior to its adoption. This pattern of behavior is on~ consistent with one of the 
classic studies in this area, Coleman, Katz and Menzel (1966), on the adoption of a 
new medical drug by doctors in four midwestern communities. The study 
indicates that salesmen and direct mail were the most frequent source of original 
kn9wledge about the drug, but just prior to adoption the doctor was most likely to 
seek out a colleague or consult a professional journal article. Another general 
finding in the empirical literature on innovations is that individuals are reluc-
tant to spend much time collecting and processing information. The accuracy of 
their own data to a large extent will be dependent on those of their colleagues and 
friends. From a prescriptive point of view these findings suggest that informal 
contacts may play at least as important a role in providing information as the 
market system. 
Finally there is literature emerging which indicates that individual attitudes 
toward risk are impacted by the way information is diffused and processed. 
Kunreuther et al. (1978) in a field survey of 3,000 homeowners in flood and 
earthquake prone areas found that people's decisions to purchase insurance 
were determined by past experience with floods or earthquakes and interperso-
nal contact with other policyholders rather than by a comparison of the risk 
involved ir. relation to the benefits of insurance. In a complementary set of 
controlled laboratory experiments on insurance Slovic et al (1977) found that 
individuals preferred to insure themselves against high probability-low loss 
events rather than against catastrophes which had a very small chance of 
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occurrence. These findings imply that individuals may view uncertainty and 
risk in a different was than has traditionally been assumed by economists. 
Prescriptive Analysis 
The descriptive phase encompasses problem formulation, institutional arrange-
ments and decision process of the different parties in response to different 
information. They are a fundamental input to the prescriptive phase, which is 
concerned with the specification and evaluation of a set of alternative policies. 
The options include relying primarily on market mechanisms so that individuals 
and firms have free choice as to what actions they pursue, or having the 
government intervene in the process through regulation, the use of incentives or 
the direct provision of specific services. Let us illustrate each of these alternati-
ves within the context of the two specific examples presented above. 
Rely on Market Mechanisms. In the case of disaster insurance, this alternative 
would consist of allowing individuals and businesses to locate in specific areas, 
take their chances with respect to a potential catastrophe and bear any losses 
themselves or through voluntary insurance coverage, The ozone depletion 
problem would be viewed as a concern of consumers and businesses. Informa-
tion could be made publicly available through journals and the mass media that 
the use of certain types of aerosol cans may have harmful environmental effects . 
The responsibility for initiating any changes would be in the hands of consumers 
through their purchase decisions and with firms through their production 
decisions. 
Institute Regulations. The government could play an active role in mitigating 
losses from natural hazards by imposing specific land-use controls and building 
codes on new structures slated to be built in hazard-prone areas. Homeowners 
applying for government-financed VA and FHA mortgages for new construction 
in these areas could also be required to purchase insurance as a condition for 
such a loan. 
With respect to CFC emissions from spray cans, the government could impose a 
regulation which would ban the use of CFC as of a specified date. The choice of 
this deadline might reflect the tradeoffs between the costs of continuing to 
produce a ,,harmful" product and the economic and social disruption associated 
with preemptorily banning its use. 
Develop Incentives. The government could develop incentives for protecting 
homeowners against the financial losses from natural disasters by subsidizing 
insurance premiums on existing structures in order to make coverage more 
attractive. In the same spirit property tax rates could reflect the degree of risk 
associated with locating in a particular area. Similar measures could be utilized 
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with respect to coping with the CFC-ozone problem. Subsidies or tax credits 
could be provided to businesses who were capable of producing substitutes for 
CFC. In particular, the government might provide a lump sum transfer to the 
CFC industry to aid them in any reconversion process. As an alternative, the 
government could impose severe taxes on the CFC industry so that firms would 
have an incentive to develop alternative products which would not threaten to 
pollute the atmosphere. 
Direct Provision of Services. One way to cope with the financial consequences of 
natural disasters would be to have the government provide liberal relief to 
victims in the form of grants and low-interest loans. By providing this type of aid, 
there would be less incentive for individuals to purchase insurance coverage 
than if the government were to do nothing. In the case of the CFC problem, the 
government could provide information services to the public as to the potential 
adverse effects of using aerosol sprays. If there were great uncertainty on the 
impact of CFC on the environment, then the government would have to 
determine carefully the form in which the message should be presented. 
How can one make a wise choice among these different options? There are two 
general criteria which should be explicitly considered in evaluating the different 
options . 
1. Impact on Allocation of Resources. Each one of the possible courses of action 
will determine how individuals and firms will operate. For example, if the 
government decided to do nothing to protect victims against disastrous losses and 
no insurance were available, then some firms and households may prefer not to 
locate in certain hazard prone areas. To the extent that these units aided our 
economic growth and development this might be considered a loss to society. 
Regulating hazard-prone areas would produce the same type of tradeoffs. On the 
other side of the coin, there are a set of negative consequences associated with the 
development of a hazard-prone area which society must pay for one way or 
another . If the public sector incurred the financial costs associated with the 
disaster , then society would be paying for the losses of a few. 
The problem of resource allocation is considerably more complex when one 
moves from the financial consequences of natural hazards to the physical and 
economic consequences of environmental hazards such as the depletion of ozone 
due to CFC. In such cases, one has to balance the positive economic impact of 
these activities with the potential negative consequences, not only for the 
present generation, but also for future generations. We require considerable 
information on the short-run and long-run impacts of certain actions in order to 
make final judgments on resource allocation effects. 
2. Impact on Equity and Distribution of Resources. A second measure which 
should be considered in choosing among alternatives is the impact of different 
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measures on the welfare of members of society. If society feels that it is their 
responsibility to aid victims of natural catastrophes because that is a risk all of us 
should bear, then liberal federal disaster relief would be an appropriate policy 
option for consideration. Such a decision may also be suggested because of 
income distribution concerns. If, one the other hand, there is a feeling that 
people should be responsible for the consequences of their actions, then some 
combination of the other options may be desirable. 
When one moves out of the relatively simplistic world of natural hazards to the 
physical and economic impact of climate changes then the equity and distributio-
nal questions become intimately connected with legal issues of responsibility. If 
one takes the position that those who undertake specific actions must also bear 
the costs, then environmental problems associated with using CFCs may have to 
be handled by either some form of regulation or a tax imposed on firms . WithotJ,t 
these measures consumers and firms are unlikely to take preventive action. In 
economic terms, the benefit associated with restricting CFCs can be treated as a 
public good. In other words, the consumer gets so little perceived benefit to 
himself of not using aerosol sprays that he continues to do. Similary, firms 
producing the good have no incentive to change their behavior. If CFCs were not 
produced, society might be better off with respect to a reduction in environmen-
tal hazards. If instead one feels that the private sector should monitor its own 
activities, then a laissez faire approach might be viewed as desirable. 
The impact of different policies on resource allocation and distribution of 
resources will be intimately related to the descriptive phase of the process. For 
example, the types of institutional arrangements will indicate how information 
is collected and disseminated among the relevant parties. An understanding of 
the decision processes will provide insight into how information is processed or 
misprocessed by the relevant groups. We now will elaborate on the specific 
natural hazards example to illustrate how one links the descriptive and prescrip-
tive phases. 
C. Linking Descriptive and Prescriptive Analysis: The Case 
of Disaster Insurance3 
Descriptive Phase 
Between 1973 and 1977 a multidisciplinary team supported by funds from the 
National Science Foundation, were determining the critical factors influencing 
the voluntary purchase of insurance against the consequences of low-probability 
events such as flood or earthquakes. Descriptive research methods included a 
3 The "\aterial in this section is abstracted from Kunreuther and Slovic (1978). 
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field survey and laboratory experiments. The field survey permitted the discov-
ery of differences between insured and uninsured homeowners in hazard-prone 
areas, while the laboratory experiments permitted us to identify causal rela-
tionships through controlled manipulation of relevant variables. 
The basic sampling plan for the field survey involved face-to-face interviews 
with 2,055 homeowners living in flood prone areas through the United States, 
and 1,006 homeowners in eighteen earthquake prone areas of California. 
Approximately half of the sample individuals were insured against flood or 
earthquake. 
The analysis of the field survey data revealed that a significant number of 
homeowners in flood and earthquake prone areas either knew nothing about the 
availability and terms of insurance, or had inaccurate information. The survey 
also revealed that many residents had little idea of the probability or potential 
damage from a future disaster. One of the most surprising results was the large 
number of uninsured homeowners who expected no federal aid at all in the 
aftermath of a major disaster. This indicated that neglect of insurance could not 
be attributed to expectations of generous government relief. 
In the laboratory experiments, subjects were presented with a series of gam-
bles, each of which involved a specified probability of losing a given amount of 
money. Losses and probabilities were varied across gambles. In one experiment 
subjects were permitted to buy insurance against the loss at an actuarially fair 
rate. Additional experiments varied the premiums so that insurance was offered 
at subsidized rates and commercial rates. In these experiments, subjects consi-
dered well-defined insurance problems in isolation and without real stakes at 
risk. To supplement this format, an elaborate farm management game was 
designed and run by a computer. While playing this game over a five-hour 
period, individuals had to decide for each year which crops they were going to 
plant, what fertilizers to use, and what insurance they would purchase against 
various natural hazards. Subjects' earnings in the game determined their salary. 
The results from the experiments consistently showed that people preferred to 
insure against relatively high-probability, low-loss hazards and tended to reject 
insurance in situations where the probability of loss was low and the potential 
losses were high. These results suggest that peoples natural predispositions run 
counter to what would be predicted by normative models of choice such as 
expected utility theory, which assumes that risk-averse individuals should 
desire a mechanism to protect themselves from rare catastrophic losses that they 
could not bear themselves. 
When asked about their insurance decisions, subjects in both the laboratory and 
survey studies indicated a disinclination to worry about low-probability hazards. 
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Such a strategy is understandable in view of the fact that limitations of people's 
time, energy, and attentional capacities create a ,,finite reservoir of concern". 
Unless we ignored many low-probability threats we would become so burdened 
that any sort of productive life would become impossible. Another insight 
gleaned from the experiments and the survey is that people think of insurance as 
an investment. Making claims and receiving payments (by insuring against 
more probable losses) seems to be viewed as a return on the premium. Insuring 
against hazards that do not occur seems a waste of money. 
Prescriptive Phase 
The above study suggests that the primary cause of failure in the disaster 
insurance market is consumer disinterest. If insurance is to be marketed on a 
voluntary basis, then consumer's attitudes and information processing limita-
tions must be taken into account. Policymakers and insurance providers must 
find ways to communicate the risks and arouse concern for the hazards. One 
method found to work in the laboratory experiments is to increase the preceived 
probability of disaster by lengthening the individual's time horizon. For examp-
le, considering the risk of experiencing a 100-year flood at least once during a 25-
year period, instead of considering the risk in one year, raises the probability to 
.22 and may thus cast flood insurance in a more favorable light. Another step 
would have insurance agents play an active role in educating homeowners about 
the proper use of insurance as a protective mechanism and providing informa-
tion about the availability of insurance, rate schedules, deductible values, etc. Of 
course, these actions may not be effective. It may also be necessary to institute 
some form of mandatory coverage, perhaps having banks and other financial 
institutions require disaster insurance as a condition for a mortgage. 
D. Suggestions for Research on Climatic Change 
A parallel type of analysis appears appropriate for evaluating the impacts of 
technological developments on climatic change. The descriptive and prescripti-
ve phases of the analysis, however, are considerably more complex because we 
do not currently have a good understanding of the cause and effect relationship 
between human and natural processes and climatic change. Furthermore, we 
are uncertain as to the long-range impact that specific atmospheric or other 
patterns will have on human society. We will discuss future research questions 
in the context of the conceptual framework presented in Figure 1. 
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Nature of the Problem 
The large variation of past weather patterns from year to year make it extremely 
difficult both to project long-term trends in climatic change and to separate out 
changes due to human tampering (e.g., technology, population growth) from 
natural causes. Furthermore, there is disagreement among atmospheric scien-
tists as to the impact that certain changes in climate will have on economic and 
social conditions in the world. 
An interesting example illustrating the above points is the recent controversy 
concerning the impact of additional carbon dioxide in the atmosphere caused by 
the burning of fossil fuels (i.e., coal, oil and gas) and clearing of land (i.e., 
destruction of plant life and soil organic matter). The most generally accepted 
models all predict that an increased carbon dioxide will increase temperatures 
near the ground. However, these models neglect feedback mechanisms for 
clouds and ocean circulation so that a number of respect atmospheric scientists 
feel that a global cooling trend still predominates. They support this hypothesis 
by citing the lack of warming during the industrial period since 1940 (Cooper, p. 
504). Other scientists feel that an increase in carbon dioxide will play a significant 
role in impeding the earth's emitted radiation, thus warming the atmosphere 
through the so-called ,,greenhouse effect" 4• There is thus uncertainty about how 
much temperature change will result from a given increased level of carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere. Furthermore, there is great uncertainty on the 
impact that changes in temperature will have on agricultural productivity in 
certain parts of the world. Colder climatic zones could now become more 
productive if indeed there is a warming effect while other areas will suffer. The 
uncertainties associated with the problem create difficulties in designing mean-
ingful policies. 
Scientists also have limited knowledge· on the interrelationship between the 
impacts of weather modification in one part of the world and its effects on other 
parts of the globe. A graphic example of this climatic dependence is provided by 
Hurricane Inez which threatened the Gulf Coast in 1968. The storm never hit the 
U.S. but filled large portions of the Mexican altiplano with sufficient water to 
assure the area of favorable crops for a season (Schneider, p. 21). The analysis of 
benefits and costs of undertaking weather modification actions, such as seeding 
of hurricanes, has to reflect the potential impacts on a global rather than national 
level. Naturally the analysis becomes more cumbersome and uncertain as the 
outcome space is broadened in this way. 
4 The process is called the .,greenhouse effect" because carbon dioxide acts in the same manner as a greenhouse. It is 
completely transparent to the wavelengths of light produced by the sun but absorbs the earth's emitted radiation, 
partly transmitting it back to earth and partly out to space. The resulting warming effect is similar to that produced by a 
greenhouse which is transparent to incoming solar radiation but impedes outgoing heat radiation. 
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Institutional Arrangements. There is a natural bias in coping with problems, 
where long-term effects are uncertain and phenomena are understood only 
imperfectly, to concentrate primarily on the short-term impacts of specific 
actions. Normally any measures to ban or regulate human activities will produce 
negative economic and political consequences. Since politicians are elected at 
relatively short intervals they have little incentive to endorse specific bans 
which may adversely effect their constituencies. There is a need to understand 
in what ways the points of view of different interest groups affected by a specific 
problem - consumers, industries , government, unborn generations - are impac-
ted by current institutional arrangements. For example, in developing a pro-
gram for coping with the .impact of climatic change on food reserves the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture is the sole source of technical information for 
developing policy. Critics contend that the USDA favors the largest food produ-
cer and that information from other food experts should also provide advice to 
the executive branch as part of the policy making process (Schneider, p. 43). 
Finally, it is also important to understand the relationship between the institu-
tional arrangements and the responsibility for certain actions. For example, if 
the federal government is held responsible for negative outcomes of certain 
actions, such as weather modification, then they will have an incentive to do 
nothing. As a case in point, consider the disastrous flood in Rapid City, South 
Dakota on June 9, 1972, which caused$ 163 million in property damage. Only a 
few hours before the flood the South Dakota School of Mines and Technology 
under contract with the Department of Interior carried on a cloud seeding 
operation known as Project Skywater near Rapid City. A class-action suit has 
been brought against the Federal Government on the grounds that the cloud 
seeding operations was dangerous and hence should not have been undertaken 
(Schneider, p. 237). Meteorologists are uncertain as to whether the cloud seeding 
operation could have caused qle flood. What is more certain is the reluctance of 
the Federal Government to undertake such experiments in the future even if 
the expected benefits exceed the expected costs. Being held financially responsi-
ble for negative outcomes and only gaining psychic rewards for beneficial results 
produces a strong bias towards not acting at all. 
Decision Processes. We have already emphasized the imperfect information 
processing capabilities of individuals and the limited amount of data they use. In 
areas such as climatic change and weather modification, which are sufficiently 
complex and where the ways of evaluating different options lie beyond our 
individual knowledge and understanding, there is a tendency for us to rely on 
experts and authorities for guidance. Should there be considerable uncertainty 
and disagreement among scientists and policy makers as to the consequences of 
different measures, policy makers are likely to trust no one and maintain the 
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status quo. This behavior will be reinforced by a natural bias to do nothing unless 
the organization is faced with a severe problem or crisis situation. There is 
substantial evidence from the organizational behavior literature supporting this 
point. For example, March and Simon (1958) in their analysis of organizational 
change have concluded that the individual or organization does not search for 
new alternatives unless the present course is perceived to be unsatisfactory. 
Only after a problem or crisis exists is there a need to take action. Lawless (1977) 
has documented the importance of public alarm in triggering remedial action 
with respect to social shock over technology. In a series of short case histories of 
recent episodes he documented the sequence of events leading to public alarm 
and the impact of this concept on specific regulatory actions. Schneider (1976) 
also provides a number of examples in the area of climatic change which 
illustrate the importance of a perceived crisis in order to generate change. 
Precriptive Phase 
Guidelines for a prescriptive strategy in the area of weather modification and 
climatic change can be based on the nature of the risk and its outcome. The 
following concepts may be useful in beginning to reflect on the merits of 
alternative courses of action. 
Degree of Reversibility. If the impact of certain atmospheric emissions cannot 
easily be reversed in the future then it may be necessary to undertake protective 
measures today even where the impact of the climatic change cannot be easily 
estimated. One reason that scientists are concerned with the concentration of 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is that it seems unlikely that even the most 
advanced future technology will make feasi'ble its removal (Cooper, 1978, p. 510). 
Future research should be undertaken to understand better the degree of 
reversibility of different phenomena. 
Risk Associated with Certain Activities. As the probability and magnitude of loss 
associated with specific activities (e.g. , use of CFCs) increases, then regulations 
will prove more desirable, other things being equal. Scientists need to obtain 
better data on the relationship between atmospheric emissions and climatic 
change before making a strong case for remedial action. 
Adjustment Process. The more difficult it is for society to undertake effective 
actions at the onset or immediately after a severe crisis the more important long-
range planning becomes . In the case of climatic change Schneider feels that the 
crisis , which will occur if we do not plan now, will be catastrophic so that 
relatively little could be done in the short-run to cope with its impact. He 
proposes instead a strategy of ,,prudence, negotiation and margins of safety in all 
our future planning so that we are adequately prepared for such probable 
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misfortunes as extended periods of bad weather and their harmful effects on 
crops" (p. 39). 
Responsibility. We need to clarify who will be responsible for the costs of 
undertaking changes prior to a crisis and who is responsible after a catastrophe 
occurs. The proposed policies will be very different if governmental agencies are 
held fully accountable for coping with problems of climatic change than if 
consumers and businesses are expected to share the risk. 
The above concepts suggest the following five stage process for developing and 
analyzing prescriptive measures. 
1. Specification of Adjustments. Experts individually or in groups should devel-
op an alternative set of adjustments to cope with a particular problem. For 
example, in the CFC-ozone example one could consider the following set of 
adjustments : banning the aerosol can in 1981, waiting to ban the can until 1984, 
not banning the can, taxing the producers of aerosol cans, etc . 
2. Scenario Generation. Experts should develop a set of scenarios outlining 
possible outcomes associated with different actions . They should carefully 
document what we know and do not know about specific phenomena and their 
potential consequences. 
3. Group Discussions. Experts from relevant physical and social sciences should 
engage in a group discussion to determine the probabilities and outcomes from 
each scenario. They should jointly recognize the uncertainty associated with 
certain events and provide a detailed specification · of the multidimensional 
nature of the outcomes (e.g., economic impact, environmental impact, quality of 
life impact) . 
4. Evaluation of Scenarios. A procedure should be agreed upon for evaluating 
different scenarios with respect to prespecified objectives. In this process there is 
a need to understand the potential conflicts among different interest groups (e.g., 
consumers, firms directly or indirectly affected by the adjustment, government, 
etc.) . Some attention should be paid to the accuracy of information which each 
group has. 
5. Implementation. The necessary changes in organization and institutional 
arrangements should be determined as a function of specific policies. For 
example, what governmental impact would certain regulatory measures or tax 
incentives have on governmental agency's responsibility in coping with a 
particular climatic change problem? 
The above procedure is a general one which could be followed in coping with a 
wide variety of policy-related issues. In the case of climatic change and weather 
modification , the need for a systematic evaluation of alternatives and conse-
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quences by experts from different groups is particularly critical because of the 
potentially grave but uncertain consequences certain phenomena are likely to 
have on the world in the next few decades. Whether or not such a process will be 
followed for coping with weather remains to be seen. 
Abstract 
This paper presents a conceptual framework for evaluating alternative pro-
grams which deal with natural hazards and weatherrelated risks. The frame-
work stresses the importance of integrating descriptive or behavioral analysis 
with prescriptive measures. In particular there is a need to understand the 
institutional arrangements and decision processes of the interested parties as a 
prelude to formulating and evaluating alternative plans. 
Empirical evidence on the decision processes associated with the purchase of 
disaster insurance suggests ways of linking descriptive and prescriptive analysis 
for dealing with natural hazards. A parallel type of analysis is undertaken for 
evaluating what action, if any, should be taken with respect to the manufact-
uring of aerosol spray cans which use chlorofluorocarbons (CFC), given that 
CFC destroys ozone in the atmosphere. 
Zusammenfassung 
Der Beitrag prasentiert ein Konzept zur Evaluation alternativer, auf das 
Management naturlicher Gefahren und klimatischer Anderungen bezogener 
Programme. Dabei wird besondere Bedeutung auf eine Integration deskriptiver 
und verhaltensorientierter Analyse mit normativen Ansatzen gelegt. Insbeson-
dere besteht ein Analysebedarf von institutionellen Regelungen und Entschei-
dungsprozessen bei interessierten Gruppen als vorgelagerte Phase der Formu-
lierung und Beurteilung alternativer Plane. 
Die empirische EntscheidungsprozeBanalyse, verbunden mit der Untersuchung 
realisierter Versicherungsabschli.isse, zeigt Wege auf, wie deskriptive und nor-
mative Analyse integriert werden konnen. Parallel wird untersucht, welche 
Aktivitaten in bezug auf die Herstellung von Chlorfluorkohlenwasserstoffen als 
Treibmittel in Spraydosen unternommen werden sollten, wobei unterstellt 
wird, daB diese Stoffe den Ozongehalt der Atmosphare zerst6ren. 
Resume 
Directives pour le management des dangers naturels et des changements de 
climat 
L'article presente une conception pour !'evaluation de programmes alternatifs 
se raportant au management de dangers naturels et de changements climati-
ques. On attache a cet effet de !'importance a !'integration d'une analyse 
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descriptive tenant aussi compte du comportement, avec des mesures normati-
ves. Il y a en particulier un besoin d'analyse des reglements et des operations 
decisives institutionnelles des groupes interesses, en tant que phase intermediai-
re de la formulation et du jugement des plans alternatifs . 
L' analyse decisive et em piriq ue du processus associee al' examen des conclusions 
d 'assurances realisees montre comment les analyses descriptives et normatives 
peuvent etre integrees. On examine, parallelement a cela, quelles activites 
devraient etre entreprises par raport a la fabrication des hydrogenes carbures 
fluorides chloriques, en tant qu'agents moteurs dans les boites aerosol; on 













Figure 1. Framework for Analysis (see page 887) 
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